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REVIEWS
A COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO CRIME CONTROL
Arval A. Morris*
THE HONEST POLITICIAN's GUIDE TO CRIE CONTROL. By Norval

Morris & Gordon Hawkins. Chicago, London: University of Chicago
Press. 1969. Pp. xi, 271. $5.95.
The presidential campaign of 1968 had two basic issues: the Vietnam War and Law and Order. Of the two issues the War in Vietnam
was the more important; but it was not debated because it had already been discussed ad nauseam, because President Johnson had announced his decision to retire from public office and his decision to
stop the bombing of North Vietnam, because peace negotiations in
Paris had started, and because the peace negotiations allowed each
of the presidential aspirants to wrap himself in patriotism and bypass
the issue of the Vietnam War on the ground that ill-considered or
poorly-informed campaign statements could only impede the progress
of the Paris peace talks thereby harming America's fighting men by
prolonging an already overly prolonged war. With the issue of Vietnam
safely anesthetized, the remaining, basic issue of the 1968 presidential
campaign was Law and Order.
The issue of Law and Order turned out to be a renamed version of
Barry Goldwater's 1964 campaign slogan: "crime in the streets." But
"crime-in-the-streets" is not a Nanny-coo. It is a military slogan, a
battle cry; and it was not sloughed off in 1968's raucus shuffle of
presidential politics. On the contrary, Law and Order was exploited
to the hilt. George C. Wallace moulded his entire campaign around
this issue, and Richard M. Nixon planned to, and did, give it a huge
part of his time and rhetoric. Mr. Nixon's opening salvo came on
August 8, 1968, in Miami when he accepted his party's Presidential
nomination and delivered what he described beforehand as "the most
* Professor of Law, University of Washington, BA. Colorado College, 1951; MA.
University of Colorado, 1952, J.D. 1955; LL.M. Yale, 1958.
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important speech of my life." For him America's problem was crime,
and candidate Nixon's solution was a simple one, easily understood by
voters: "If we are to restore order and respect for law in this country, there's one place we're going to begin: We're going to have a new
Attorney General of the United States."' Thus, the bugaboo issue of
the 50's-that of being "soft on communism"--was finally dropped,
and the cry now was that the incumbents in general, and Attorney
General Ramsey Clark in particular, had been "soft on crime." Ignoring the fact that, in this country, criminal law enforcement is primarily a job for local authorities, candidate Nixon, in his first major
campaign speech on crime, September 29, 1968, repeated his charge
that National officials had been "soft on crime," and revealed what
he meant by Law and Order when he said:'
Some have said that we are a sick society .

. .

. We're sick, all

right, but not in the way they mean. We are sick of what has
been allowed to go on in this nation for too long. Under the stewardship of the present Administration, crime and violence . . .
have increased ten times faster than population.
Now by way of excuse, the present Administration places the
But poverty is only one contributing facblame on poverty ....
tor .... The truth is that we will reduce crime and violence when

we enforce our laws-when we make it less profitable, and a lot
more risky, to break our laws. One lesson has not been lost on the
criminal community. Today only one in every eight crimes results
in conviction and punishment. Today an arrest is made in only
one in every five burglaries. Today an arrest is made in less than
a third of reported robberies. Today it is comparatively safe to
break the law. Today all across the land guilty men walk free
from hundreds of courtrooms. Something has gone terribly wrong
in America.
With these words candidate Nixon charged that America's sickness
could be cured by law enforcement, and that the police, prosecutors
and courts were not doing their jobs. Later, the implication changed
and an accusing finger was pointed at our courts, especially the Supreme Court of the United States. They were the real culprits because
1. R. Harris, Justice: The Crisis of Law, Order and Freedom, in AiucA 14 (1970).
2. Id. at 25-26.
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their decisions had shackled the police and prosecutors while coddling
criminals. That Law and Order had become a popular issue after the
1964 presidential campaign and after the ghetto riots of 1966 and
1967 was also perceived by Congress: it enacted the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.a
By the time the election returns were in, and Richard M. Nixon was
declared the thirty-seventh President of the United States by seventenths of one percent, some observers of American social life contended that the Law and Order issue had aroused far more fear and
had set the stage for repression rather than having opened discussion
about the basic requisites needed for a just society and a just legal
order. In cities of more than a half million population, 40 percent
of the residents now say that they are afraid of crime. One third of
the American people are afraid to walk alone at night through their
cities. Gun sales have soared, and the best estimate is that ninety
million guns are in private hands. Today, there are millions of housewives and other women and men in this country who have never so
much as fired a gun, but whose hearts are filled with fear and whose
minds are filled with visions of shooting fantasies drawn from T-V's
violent cowboys, soldiers, gangsters, policemen, private eyes, and secret-service men in Brooks Brothers suits.
Suburban whites filled with fear and ignorance have rapidly organized themselves into police support and vigilante groups. They fail
to realize that over 4 million of the nearly 4.5 million index crimes
(willful homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary,
theft of $50 or over and motor vehicle theft) that were known to the
police in 1968 occurred in cities, and that today's willful homicide rate
is well below that of 1933. Fearful of racial assaults, most white Americans in cities and suburbs ignore the fact that blacks and not whites
are the primary victims of crimes committed by blacks. Furthermore,
fearful city dwellers and suburbanites fail to realize that blacks are
victimized by crime far more frequently than are whites. For example,
the President's Crime Commission found that in Chicago a black man
is six times more often a victim of crime than a white man, and that
a black woman is victimized nearly eight times as often as a white
3. For discussion about this act and the events surrounding its passage see, PL HAnms,
THE FEAR oF Cimur (1969).
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woman. Finally, it should be noted that the risk of serious attack
coming from a stranger on the street is only one-half the risk of such
attack coming from spouses, family members, friends or acquaintances, and that the closer the relationship the greater the hazard.
Taken together, murders involving spouse killing spouse, parent
killing child, other family killings, romantic triangles and lovers'
quarrels, and arguments between those previously acquainted with
one another account for about 80 percent of all homicides in
America. 4
Nevertheless, fear has swept across our land and its fervent cry is
"Law and Order." There is the fear of crime and the fear of the fear
of crime, the fear of black men and the fear of robust expressions of
differences of opinions and styles of life. Fear and widespread anxiety
create a climate hospitable to harsh solutions and repression, and repression flourishes because ordinary men give way to their fears and
because politicians create and manipulate fear to achieve repression
and their own political ends. In some areas of our country the American dream is turning into a nightmare.
Given this milieu that surrounds current discussions about crime
and the control of crime in this country, it is with good reason that
Norval Morris5 and Gordon Hawkins 6 entitled their excellent, new
book: The Honest Politician'sGuide to Crime Control. They correctly
see that America's problems are two: we must reduce the fear of
crime as well as crime itself. The authors eschew all simple-minded
solutions to the problems of crime, especially those that are wrapped
up in the slogan "Law and Order." Instead, their cure for crime is
"not a sudden potion nor a lightning panacea but rather a legislative
and administrative regimen which would substantially reduce the impact of crime."1 What then, is the honest politician's guide to crime
control?
Before a rational program can exist, the aims of the program must
be formulated and clearly set forth. What are the appropriate aims
4.

N. MORRIS AND G. HAwEins, THE HONEST PoLrIcIAN's GUIDE TO CRIM

57 (1969)

CONTROL

[hereinafter cited as MoRRis & HAWxinS].

5. Professor of Law and Criminology and Director of the Center for Studies in
Criminal Justice at the University of Chicago.
6. Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Sydney, Australia.
7. MoRRIs & HAwxiNs, at ix.
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of the criminal law; or, put another way, under what circumstances
it is proper to use the criminal law to regulate human conduct? For
Morris and Hawkins the proper aims of the criminal law are "to protect the citizen's person and property, and to prevent the exploitation
or corruption of the young and others in need of special care or protection." 8 Given their clear statement of the proper functions of the
criminal law, the authors set forth their "first principle of our cure
for crime: we must strip off the moral excrescences on our criminal
justice system so that it may concentrate on the essential."9 Thus,
one way of getting rid of crime is to get rid of that part of the criminal
law which exceeds its proper limits, and which is usually enforced at
the cost of neglecting its primary tasks.
THE CRISIS OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION

0

American criminal law is highly moralistic; it is enforceable only
in an uneven, sporadic and discriminatory way. In significant part it
seeks to coerce men to virtue by using the police to regulate their private moral conduct. It is greatly in need of change. More than threefourths of all the people locked up in local jails are drunks, vagrants,
mentally ill or defective, or social misfits of other kinds. The criminal
law is a singularly inept instrument for achieving social virtue. In
addition, our moralistic criminal law is extraordinarily costly because
it frequently creates that which it seeks to eliminate (e.g. drug use by
creating circumstances of great profit for organized crime) and because it directs law enforcement away from its basic tasks. Moreover
the morality sought by the criminal law has not been a consistent morality. For example, in 1810, a man in South Carolina could own, whip
and sell slaves, as well as split up and destroy slave families, but if he
uttered a blasphemy in a public place, he committed a crime; in 1910,
a woman could drink as much whiskey as she wanted, but she could
not vote nor appear in public in a one-piece bathing suit; in 1920,
she could vote and appear in public in a one-piece bathing suit, but
she committed a crime if she drank whiskey. The simple fact is that
8. Moam & HAWxINS, at 4.
9. Momus & HAWKxNS, at 2.
10. For additional elaboration see, Kadish, The Crkis of Overcriminalization, 374
A_-mi.s 157 (1967).

855

Washington Law Review

Vol. 45: 851, 1970

most of our criminal laws concerning drunkenness, narcotics, gambling
and sexual behavior, and a good deal of them concerning juvenile
delinquency are highly moralistic, wholly misguided and ought to be
repealed. The crime of drunkenness presents an excellent example of
the problems created by overcriminalization."
Over two million arrests each year-one out of every three arrests
made in this country-are for the crime of public drunkenness. This
represents more arrests than for any other crime. One-half of all persons who commit misdemeanors commit the crime of public drunkenness. Additionally, we don't know how many people are picked up
for public drunkenness but charged with some other crime, but we
do know that, in 1968, six hundred thousand arrests were made for
disorderly conduct (second only to drunkenness) and that ninety-nine
thousand arrests were made for vagrancy. The arrests made for drunkenness alone tally more than twice the number of arrests made for the
combined total of the seven serious crimes which the FBI calls its
"Index crimes" (willful homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault,
robbery, burglary, theft of $50 or over and motor vehicle theft).
The estimated cost of handling each drunkenness case-arrest,
court, jail time-is $50 per arrest. Conservatively estimated, that
means we spend about $100 million per year for our use of the criminal
law to handle drunk offenders, and this figure does not include a penny
spent for rehabilitative treatment or subsequent prevention of drunkenness, which are the realistic ways to approach this problem. Furthermore, the great number of drunkenness arrests overload police
capacities and jails, as well as clog the courts. A good example of the
way overcriminalization, in this case public drunkenness, interferes
with proper police activity comes from a study of Washington, D.C.
during a nine-month period. A special tactical police force unit officially created "to combat serious crime" made 44 percent of its arrests
for drunkenness. In another city 95 percent of the short-term prisoners
were drunkenness offenders.
The fact is that the criminal law has not been effective in enforcing
morality or in deterring public drunkenness, and its jail sentences have
not rehabilitated the chronic offenders. The criminal law is a singularly
11.
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inept tool to cope with public drunkenness. The only thing it accomplishes is the temporary removal of people believed to be unseemly
to the public. Moreover, what little is accomplished by the criminalization of drunkenness is done at the cost of using money and manpower that could better be employed on behalf of the proper tasks of
criminal law enforcement. The obvious point is to repeal the crime of
public drunkenness. Authors Morris and Hawkins suggest responsible
and workable programs through which persons drunk in public can
properly be handled by personnel other than those engaged in criminal
law enforcement.
The evils of overcriminalization, illustrated here by the crime of
public drunkenness, have also been shown by Morris and Hawkins in
their case against other crimes such as: narcotics and drug abuse, 2
gambling,' 3 disorderly conduct and vagrancy, 14 abortion 5 and certain
sex behavior crimes such as adultery, fornication, illicit cohabitations,
statutory rape, bigamy, incest, sodomy, homosexuality, prostitution,
pornography and obscenity.' In these instances the authors' recommendations either discard the crime altogether, or create a new one
no broader than that needed to vindicate the essential interest at stake,
while ridding the statute books of useless overcriminalization. An
example of the latter approach is statutory rape. The authors recognize that: 7
It is proper for the criminal law to seek to protect children from
the sexual depradations of adults, and adults and children from
the use of force, and certain types of fraud in sexual relationships.
Further, there is some justification for the use of the criminal law
to suppress such kinds of public sexual activity or open sexual
solicitation as are widely felt to constitute a nuisance or an affront to dignity. But beyond this, in a post-Kinsey and post-Johnson and Masters age, we recognize that the criminal law is largely
both unenforceable and ineffective, and we think that in some
areas the law itself constitutes a public nuisance.
They note that statutory rape is usually a felony and that the stat12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.

M RRIS
MORRIS
MORRIS
MORRIS
MORRIS
MORRIS

& HAwxwIS,
& HAwxns,
& HAwxnws,
& HAwxs,
& HAwws,
& HAWni s,

at
at
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at
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8-10.

10-11.
12-13.
13-19.

15-24.
15.
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utory age of consent varies from ten years of age (Florida, South
Dakota and New Mexico) to eighteen (New York and thirteen states)
but is twenty-one in Tennessee. As they say, these "variations must
confuse the divining rod of the natural lawyer!"'" Furthermore, the
maximum penalties range from death in fifteen states to ten years
imprisonment in New York. Morris and Hawkins prescribe that "the
offense of statutory rape should clearly be abolished."'" This would
leave the crime of rape on the statute books, but it would be Viking
rape, not statutory rape. Furthermore, the authors would create a
new crime-adult sexual intercourse with a minor-to cover situations
where consent has been given, but for reasons of personality growth
and development, or other reasons, it is believed that the immature
-say, under sixteen-should be protected by the criminal law from
acts of sexual intercourse where there is a significant disparity of
age between the male and female. This crime would not apply to
similarly-aged youth who engage in sexual experimentation. Of course,
"an abuse of a relation of trust or dependency should be regarded as
an aggravating circumstance." 20 This approach enables the authors to
deal with the crime of incest, an ecclesiastical offense, which can also
be abolished because the only legitimate interest to be vindicated by
incest statutes is the interest already protected by the authors' new
statute: adult sexual intercourse with a child.2 '
If the recommendations of Morris and Hawkins were followedas they should be-police could be removed from many areas where
they unsuccessfully try to regulate private conduct. The police would
then be free to devote much more attention to their primary task of
reducing serious crimes against persons and property.
A COOL LOOK AT THE CRIME STATISTICS
Periodically, newspaper headlines scream at a reader: "Crime At
New All-Time High," or "First Year of Sixties Recorded New AllTime High," or "In 1961 a 3 Percent Increase over Previous All-Time
18. Momus & HAwxms, at 16.
19. MoRRs & HAWxiNs, at 17.
20. Id.
21. Another excellent book covering these areas but published after the authors'
book went to press is H. PACKaa, TEL Ln&rs op im CrumAL SANc'oN

(1968).
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High." These statements come from the Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR) published annually by the FBI. In 1961, the UCR dropped
the "all-time high" language, but from 1962 to 1968 it was repeatedly
reported that crime was rampant and dangerously on the increase,
with annual increases ranging from 6 to 17 percent. In 1968, for example, it was reported that the risk of being a victim of a serious crime
had risen 71 percent since 1960. These statements have been picked
up and used by politicians for their own ends, and have created as an
unfortunate by-product an intense public hysteria about crime and
its supposed massive increases. How accurate are the crime statistics?
Does America really face a "rising tide of crime and anarchy?"
In light of the above quotations, the first consideration that Morris and Hawkins present is that the "general crime picture" painted
for the "general reader" by the FBI's UCR "is far from general; it
is highly selective and invariably emphasizes increases in serious
crimes."2 2 Second, it is not always possible to "distinguish between
the statements of fact as providing hard objective data and the dicta
as expressions of mere opinion.12 3 Also, there are problems of interpretation; for example, the UCR for 1960 which stated that the "first
year of the sixties recorded a new all-time high, with 98 percent more
crime than in 1950." Morris and Hawkins' response to this statement
is that:

24

Such a statement is patently liable to mislead any "general reader"
who fails to reflect that there was a substantial increase in the
United States population between 1950 and 1960. When the
crime rates, i.e., crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, are calculated
and adjustments necessary for valid comparison are made, the
actual increase was only 22 percent. And this increase was almost entirely confined to property offenses. In relation to population, murder remained unchanged, and in proportion, aggravated
assault and robbery decreased.
It is even more important to note that the figures on which these
statements are based are not figures for criminal acts that occurred but for "crimes which are counted by the police as they
become known to them." Moreover surveys carried out for the
President's Crime Commission confirmed what a variety of earlier
22. Mo Is & HAwkiNS, at 31.
23. Mo ms & HAwxNS, at 32.
24. Moasm & HAwIxwS, at 32-33.
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studies had indicated, that the actual amount of crime is several
times that reported and recorded in the UCRs. Thus, to infer
from an increase in reported crime that there is "98 percent more
crime" is to take a wild leap in the dark.
On the basis of the President's Commission figures it would be
possible for the amount of forcible rape reported to increase by
250 percent, for reported burglaries to increase by 200 percent,
for reported aggravated assaults and larcenies of $50 and over
to increase by 100 percent-all without any increase in the amount
of crime committed. It is perfectly possible that the substantial
changes and developments in reporting and estimating and recording procedures which occurred between 1950 and 1960 merely
brought out into the light more of what is called the dark figure
of crime and thus produced an increase purely statistical in character without any real increase in crime having taken place at
all. Yet all the statements in the UCRs about increases in the
volume of crime suggest that the FBI accepts the specious assumption, made by the nineteenth-century Belgian pioneer criminal statistician Adolphe Quetelet, that the amount of known
crime bears a constant relation to the amount unknown.
The point is that we simply do not have any reliable measure of the
actual amount of crime in our society. What we have is some notion
of reported crime as it has been reported to the FBI by the 8,000
local police agencies that account for 92 percent of our population.
But the relationship between reported and unreported crime remains
a mystery. Thus, it is possible for reported crime to increase (UCRs)
and actual crime to decline; we simply do not know.
A postwar study of crimes of violence in England25 shows that the
amount of reported crime can increase because of factors other than
more efficiency or uniformity in formal reporting procedures. For example, emergency telephone systems or more radio-equipped police
officers can account for more previously unrecorded crimes becoming
recorded. The same can be true whenever a change takes place in police attitudes, especially toward ghetto residents, and police officers
begin to report what previously they may have ignored. A change in
police attitudes can come about because the public has become fearful
of crime and less tolerant of it. A change of public attitudes can also
result in the public reporting more crime. The result of each of these
25. MoRRms & HAWKmS, at 33.
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circumstances can be that there is a net, statistical increase in crime,
although perhaps fully artificial. We simply do not know. It is quite
consistent with the crime statistics to posit an improvement instead
of a decline in our standards of behavior over the past few years.
The basic truth is that '(we lack reliable methods for measuring
the volume of crime" and Morris and Hawkins apply this statement
"to both the UCRs and to all presently available victim studies.1 26
Their overall conclusion on the accuracy of the crime statistics is
thate 7
the regularly published UCR percentage changes in the volume
of crime from one year or decade to another can serve no purpose beyond alarming and frightening the public, and facilitating
congressional acceptance of FBI budgetary requests.
Although the crime statistics are not reliable, Morris and Hawkins
argue for the reasonableness of the view that both the volume and
the rate of crime in America has increased, and will continue to increase unless their recommended preventive measures are followed.
Their argument does not entail that our standards of behavior are degenerating, nor that criminal anarchy is upon us. Rather, their argument assumes that our standards remain constant. They rely on four
areas of evidence for their view about increasing crime: size and structure of population, urbanization and increased affluence.
Assuming that the proportion of crimes to the population remains
stable then, obviously, each year that population increases the amount
of crime would also increase. Thus, if there were 150 million people
in the United States in 1950 and approximately 200 million in 1968,
all other things being equal, we should expect about a twenty-five
percent increase in the total amount of crime. This would be "normal."
Consequently, as our population increases (approaching 275 to 300
million by around year 2000), we can expect the total amount of
crime to increase.
The changing age structure of American population is even more
important than increases in our population. All of our statistics show
that the ages most prone to crime in this country are from 15 to 24
26. Id.
27. MoRis & HAwxs, at 34.
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with the incidence of crime increasing in the under 15 years of age;
this is the high-risk group.
Because of the unusual birth rate in the post-war years the size
of this group has been increasing much faster than other groups
in the population and will continue
to grow disproportionately
28
for at least fifteen more years.

Thus, the total volume of crime can grow without any increase in the
crime rate for any given age group. Furthermore, since black mothers
have a higher fertility rate than white mothers, there are proportionately more young blacks between the ages of 15 to 24 than there are
whites. In fact, one-half of our black Americans is under twentyfour years of age. Thus, it will be "normal" to record a greater, proportionate share of crime committed by blacks rather than whites. This
should not surprise anyone so long as our legislators fail to create
effective programs to deal with the needs of youth and the black
ghettos.
Equally important is population distribution. With very few exceptions rates for most crimes are highest in the big cities, and the
average rates increase progressively as cities become larger. For some
reason population density is usually associated with increasing seriouscrime rates.
The average rate for those offenses (willful homicide, forcible
rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, theft of $50 and
over and motor vehicle theft) are at least twice as great in cities
of more than one million as in the surburbs or rural areas.29
This ingredient must be combined with the fourth factor: that as
societies grow more affluent, especially those having an uneven distribution of affluence, the amount of crime tends to increase. And finally
we have to add the basal element of fear, because as put by the
President's Commission on Crime:80

As the level of sociability and mutual trust is reduced, streets and
public places can indeed become more dangerous. Not only will
there be less people abroad but those who are abroad will manifest
a fear and a lack of concern for each other.
28.
29.

MOomus & HAWKUns, at 35.

30.

MORRIS & HAWKINS,
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Thus, Morris and Hawkins conclude that America is in for an increase
in total crime, and we would be surprised if that did not occur.
Enough has been written so it now can be seen that given the
crime-producing forces currently at work in our society, there is little
possibility of dealing with them adequately or responsibly with any
program rolled out of the "Law and Order" slogan. Neither strict
law enforcement by police officers nor strict constructions by judges
will do the basic job; each is irrelevant to the fundamental problems.
This is not to say that proper law enforcement is immaterial, but
only to say that it does not cope with the roots of our crime problems.
What we need is a broad, legislative program constructively aimed
at youth, slums and the other basic, crime-producing forces. That is
why Morris and Hawkins produced their book for the honest politician and not the judge; it is up to him to produce the needed legislative programs.
While space demands preclude my setting forth or criticizing their
many constructive suggestions, the authors are quite correct in their
estimate that at least five percent of the budget should be appropriated immediately to devise and evaluate alternative legislative
strategies for repressing, controlling, and preventing crime within
America's context of a growing and changing population. In the long
run, an adequate legislative program dedicated to eliminating the roots
of crime could easily cost 20 percent of our gross national product,
and that, of course, would require Americans to change their national
priorities. Indeed, the modest proposal of Morris and Hawkins will
test whether we are really serious about reducing crime in the United
States or whether we are simply given over to verbalisms, and are, in
fact, "soft on crime."
REHABILITATION, PREVENTIVE DETENTION
AND ORGANIZED CRIME
What most Americans do not understand about our prison system
of corrections is that in most cases it is not only the enemy of the
prisoner, but it is also the enemy of American Society. Our prison
system of corrections is failing in very basic ways. As the President's
Crime Commission reported: "for the bulk of offenders . , . institu-
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tional commitments can cause more problems than they solve."'" Can
it truly be said of our present correctional system that because of the
treatment it gives, it makes American communities safer from crime?
I think the answer is obvious: No. This is because the available "treatment" in most penal institutions consists of little more than socially
isolating a prisoner and then varying the conditions of custody from
"regular" to "tight security" or "solitary." Prisoners are not prepared
by our prisons to assume a meaningful role in society upon release,
and many do not. The only thing surprising about recidivism, given
our correctional system, is that people should be surprised by it. The
system is also needlessly expensive. On an average day our correctional system handles about 1.3 million Americans, and it has 2.5
million admissions each year. The annual budget is over a billion dollars. I think we need to rethink the whole question of our correctional
system in America. Morris and Hawkins do not state that they know
our prison system is failing, but they do set forth several constructive
proposals, one of which will be mentioned here: a community treat32

ment program.

Their proposal confronts one of the basic conflicts in our traditional
correctional thinking. The first purpose of any correctional system is
to make communities safer by reducing crime. How can this best be
achieved? On the one hand, we impose social isolation on a criminal
by locking him up tightly behind prison walls and bars. Prison is
expulsion from the group; banishment. We believe this example will
be a deterrent to others. But, on the other hand, most prisoners are
released and are returned to society. All the evidence we have indicates
that if we preserve and strengthen a prisoner's family relationships
and if we create and preserve a prisoner's community relationships,
then we will have the best chance for his finding a constructive place
in society on release, and his avoidance of subsequent crime. Thus,
the dilemma posed for criminal corrections is whether to isolate or
not to isolate?
On the basis of the results shown by the California Youth Authority's Community Treatment Project 3 3 -now in its seventh year-and
31.
32.
33.

MORRIS & HAwxNms, at 122.
MORRIS & HAWKINS, at 120-23.
MORRIS & HAw.INS, at 121-22:

There, after initial screening which excludes some 25 percent of the males and
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for other reasons, Morris and Hawkins opt for social continuity, and
propose that instead of isolating prisoners we set up community treatment with "supervision" 34 as our most used criminal sanction. So
far, community treatment programs have proved more effective and
cheaper than prisons. They offer counseling, therapy, school tutoring
services and other rehabilitation according to an inmate's needs. On
his release, a prisoner already has stabilized family, group and community relations. They support his new life, and the likelihood of further crime is probably diminished further than our present correctional
system diminishes it. Of course, the authors do not offer community
treatment programs as the only correctional tool. Prisons, in a different form, would still have to be available for criminals who cannot
benefit from immediate community treatment. But here too, the authors have several splendid and constructive suggestions, e.g., the
hostel and full-wages prison systems, which, if followed, would enable

S to 10 percent of the girls because of the serious nature of their offenses, mental
abnormality, or strenuous community objections to direct release, convicted juvenile
delinquents have been assigned on a random basis to either an experimental group
or a control group. Those in the experimental group are returned to the community
and receive either singly or in combination such treatments as intensive individual
counseling, group counseling, group therapy, family counseling, school tutoring
services, and involvement in various other group activities. Each delinquent in this
group is treated according to a custom-tailored plan implemented at a level of
high intensity with a ratio of one staff member to twelve youths. The youths in the
control group are assigned to California's regular institutional treatment program.
The findings of this research so far reveal that only 28 percent of the experimental
group have had their paroles revoked as compared with 52 percent in the control
group which was institutionalized and then returned to the community under
regular parole supervision.
The results of this experiment have somewhat more positive implications than
the comparative studies we have referred to above.
The saving in public money is certainly substantial. The cost of the California
Community Treatment Project per youth is less than half the average cost of institutionalizing an offender. Moreover the program is now handling a group larger
than the population of one of the new juvenile institutions that the California
Youth Authority is building. An investment of some $6 to $8 million is thus
obviated. At the same time the program offers not merely "equal protection to the
public" but, at less than half the price, much more effective protection than the
traditional methods.
34. For additional discussion see, Silving, Toward a Contemporary Concept of
CriminalJustice, 4 IsRAEm L. Rav. 479 (1969).
Although . . . four-fifths of the correctional budget is spent and nine-tenths of
the correctional employees work in penal institutions, only one-third of all offenders
are confined in them; the remaining two-thirds are under supervision in the
community.
Moams & HAwxn=s, at 134. But, supervisory services are, for the most part, "grossly
understaffed, almost always underpaid, and too often undertrained." Id., at 135.
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our criminal correctional system to achieve its prime goal at much
less cost.
I find much in this valuable book to heed and admire, but there are
at least two suggestions that give me pause: preventive detention and
organized crime.
Bail serves the affluent who are accused of crime. The authors correctly point out that there are thousands of persons in this country
who are so poor that they cannot raise bail, and therefore are kept
in jail pending trial. This fact was stated by President Johnson when
he signed the 1966 Bail Reform Act:3
He [the accused] does not stay in jail because he is guilty. He
does not stay in jail because any sentence has been passed. He
does not stay in jail because he is any more likely to flee before
trial. He stays in jail for one reason only~-because he is poor.
Many are innocent:3 6
It has been estimated that 40 percent or more of the jail population is made up of unconvicted defendants. A large proportion of
these, from 40 to 60 percent, will later be released without being
convicted.
Furthermore, many who are later convicted are given sentences shorter
than those already served while they awaited trial. The indignities
and social injustices heaped upon these Americans are manifold, consisting, in part, of regimented living, surveillance, physical searches,
inadequate visitors' facilities, crowded cells and almost complete isolation from the outside world. Finally, it has been estimated by the
VERA Foundation Manhattan Bail Bond Project in New York City
that the unnecessary cost incurred by retaining those who cannot raise
bail but who otherwise would appear for trial is $50 million per year.
Thus, Morris and Hawkins have good reason when they decree that
"the money bail system shall be abolished."37
The trouble is that the authors go on to embrace the notion of preventive detention. Commendably, they try to narrow it by stating
that "pretrial detention should be reduced to the minimum possible,"
35. MoRRis & HAwxn'ls, at 113.
36. As quoted in Momus & HAWKiS, id.
37. MoRRIs & Hnwxwns, at 112.

866

Reviews
and they quote the President's Crime Commission Report to describe
the minimum: "the relatively small percent of defendants who present a significant risk of flight or criminal conduct before trial.""8
But once the principle is approved, there is no reason to believe its
application will only be to the very few. The category has already
been broadened by two identical Bills (one currently introduced in
the House and the other in the Senate) requested by President Nixon
as part of his Law and Order package, and drafted and supported by
the Department of Justice. 9 The heart of both Bills is a provision
that allows jailing an accused whenever a judicial officer, after a hearing, determines that incarceration is necessary to "assure the safety
of any other person or the community."4 0 After this decision has been
made an accused may be remanded to custody for a period not exceeding sixty days, after which, if he is still untried, he is entitled to
a reconsideration of his custody, but, of course, there is little reason
to believe that spending sixty days in jail will alter a magistrate's
view of the accused as a person too dangerous to be at large.
Pretrial detention would be less objectionable, but still unacceptable,
if only those who were accused of crime and who also fit the Crime
Commission's narrow description were the only ones actually incarcerated. But we all know that many more will be locked up if preventive detention is allowed to operate. Justices of the peace, police
magistrates and judges will jail defendants they believe to be dangerous, but what will be the accuracy of their predictions? The methods
and data for predicting dangerousness have not been developed. One
recent study of the judicial capacity to predict dangerousness states :41
There is, in fact, no reliable set of criteria for predicting dangerousness. Some judges interviewed believe that they could tell
intuitively whether or not a person was dangerous. One judge
likened the procedure to playing the violin. One judge referred to
the "dark glasses, green pants," the "fourteenth street crowd." Another judge relied on the defendant's attitude, whether he showed
38. Moms & HAwx=m, at 114.
39. S. 2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ; H.R. 12806, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess. (1969).
40. S. 2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3146A (1969).

41. Dobovir, Preventive Detention: The Lesson of Civil Disorders, 15 VnLLAOVA
L. REV. 313, 329 (1970). See also J. RAPPEPoRT, THE CULIcATI EVALUATiOx OF TH
ILL (1967) ; and Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist'sPower
=AxTny
DmAnRousnass OF Top
in Civil Commitment, PsycHoLO ToDAY, Feb., 1969, at 43.
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remorse. Still another judge based his determination on whether
he thought the defendant was telling the truth.
Under preventive detention no one will know the number of judicial
predictions that were in error because defendants will not be released,
and there will be no way to tell whether they would or would not have
committed a crime.4" Furthermore, different magistrates and judges
having differing values and personalities will differ in the accuracy
of their predictions. It should not be overlooked that President Nixon's
proposal for preventive detention allows an accused to be jailed in
order to "assure the safety of .. .the community." One wonders how

magistrates might apply such a provision to ghetto residents during a
riot.
Given our present state of knowledge, any recommendation of preventive detention is a mistake, and should be recognized as such. We
simply do not have accurate and reliable methods or data for predicting dangerousness. Until they are developed any scheme of preventive
detention will necessarily operate on substantial prejudice. Serious
and irreparable injustices and unequal protection of the laws would
be the inevitable result.
I am also troubled by the authors' recommendations on Organized
Crime. Morris and Hawkins assert that the belief in the existence of
an organized crime syndicate is "one of the most seductive and persistent of... myths."43 They do not say there is no organization; only
that there is not sufficient evidence of a single, unitary organization.
Thus, they believe it mythical to hold "that behind the diverse phenomena of crime there exists a single, mysterious, omnipotent organization which is responsible for much of it."" Their view is based on a
review of the little available evidence that tends to show the existence
of a single, organized crime network, including the Valachi papers and
evidence about the Mafia and the Cosa Nostra. They conclude that45
we have to face the fact that quite apart from the paucity and
dubious character of the available evidence it is inherently im42. On these problems generally see, Hearings on Amendments to the Bail Reform
Act Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
43. Momuis & ElAwxNs, at 203.
44. Id.
45. Mop=rs & HAwxms, at 234.
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probable that organized crime is for the most part in the hands of
a monolithic nationwide crime syndicate, controlled by a single
"commission."
Given their fundamental view that monolithic, organized crime is
a myth, the authors seek to deal with polycentrically organized crime,
which they do by removing the criminal laws which both stimulate and
protect it. Thus, our authors are led to the naive view that all we need
do is to repeal the criminal laws that make the profits for fully or semiorganized crime-gambling, narcotics, and prostitution primarily-and
that will basically take care of the matter. Of course, the authors do
not stop here, they also suggest better ways for handling these substantive matters than we currently use. New techniques should be
implemented as we repeal the many unneeded criminal laws.
The authors are without substantial fault up to this point. But, that
is not all there is to the matter. A partially or a fully organized crime
group will not abandon its prior successful ways of making large
amounts of money if its immediate sources of profit are removed. These
organized groups will try to locate other sources such as loan sharking,
infiltration of legitimate business, etc. Therefore, I can agree with
Morris and Hawkins that we should repeal the criminal laws that
create a profit for organized crime, but I cannot follow them when they
recommend that, one year after the unneeded criminal laws have been
repealed, "all special organized crime units in federal and state justice
and police departments shall be disbanded."4' 6 To the contrary, I think
we must keep a firm grip on the underworld.
CONCLUSION
While I differ with the authors on several matters, the overwhelming
bulk of this book and its recommendations are sound 7 They should
be implemented by every American state. Perhaps one point stands out
above all others. We now have a fund of scholarly knowledge about
crime control which if acted upon responsibly would reduce crime
and the fear, suffering and unhappiness brought on by crime. Morris
46. MoaPns & HAWxinS, at 203.
47. For example, see their discussion on the need and justification for compensating victims of crime; also note the Symposium on Governmental Compensation for
Victims of Violence in 43 So. CAr,. L. REv. 1 (1970).
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and Hawkins have distilled the very best thinking on the subject of
crime control, and they have expressed it in plain, readable words. In
addition, they have brought a large measure of common sense to the
area of crime control. The authors' hard sense and cogent arguments
make this book, along with Herbert Packer's, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968), one of the two best treatises on crime to come
off the press in recent years. There is no longer a need to call for yet
another study before legislative action. Morris and Hawkins have
given us an intelligent, effective and humane prescription of precisely
what we must do with our system of criminal correction. What we
need are honest politicians to legislate overdue programs if we really
want to cut our luxurious crime rates. The key is political responsibility. Now is the time not only for every politician, but for every citizen
to read this enlightened book.
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